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Note
JUVENILE COURTS: KENTUCKY LAW IN NEED OF REVISION
There is evidence, in fact, that there may be grounds for concern
that the child receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets
neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care
and regenerative treatment postulated for children.1
There is a revolution in progress which bears upon juvenile courts.
The decade of the sixties produced much criticism and some funda-
mental changes in the juvenile court system which had been placidly
accepted for over sixty-five years. The task of the seventies will be to
reformulate goals, re-examine prejudices, arouse community interest,
and revamp institutions to deal more effectively with juvenile de-
linquency. It is the author's belief, after observing the day to day
operations of juvenile courts, that an overview of the problem would
be helpful to all concerned. This is especially true of lawyers who,
until recently, had little exposure to the secretive juvenile justice
system. It is not the author's intent to compare the juvenile courts of
Kentucky to those of other states, nor to explore in any real depth
the quality of post-dispositional treatment and rehabilitation. Rather
an attempt will be made to examine the revolution as it most directly
affects the structure and procedures of juvenile courts, with emphasis
on the juvenile justice system in Kentucky. It is hoped that this analysis
will be of special value to all those charged with the responsibility of
overseeing the community interest in both the welfare of our children
and the public order.
THE PRoBLEm
Juvenile courts are informal judicial tribunals separate and dis-
tinct from criminal courts. On the one hand they deal with conduct
such as rape or robbery which would be a crime if committed by
adults. On the other hand they adjudicate activities such as way-
wardness,2 dependency,3 and truancy,4 which have no counterparts in
1Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (Fortas, J.).
2Ky. Rrv. STAT. [hereinafter cited as KRS] § 208.020 (1) (b) (1964) creates
jurisdiction over a child under eighteen years of age who does not subject himself
to the reasonable control of his parents, teacher, guardian or custodian; by
reason of being habitually disobedient.
3 KRS § 199.011 (1962) defines "neglected or dependent child" for purposes
of juvenile court jurisdiction. The term means any child who is under such
improper parental care and control or guardianship as to injure or endanger the
morals, health, or welfare of himself or others. See KRS § 208.010 (5) (1962).
4KRS § 208.020 (1)(c) (1964) subjects to juvenile court jurisdiction any
child under eighteen who is an habitual truant from home or from school.
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adult criminal codes. A classification of delinquency for either the
criminal or non-criminal type conduct can result in incarceration for
the remaining period of minority. Though nominally the court decree
of delinquency is not subject to the stigma of criminality, the public
recognizes little difference. Until recently, juvenile tribunals were
actually exempt from strict compliance with the due process guarantees
of the fourteenth amendment. Whether the legal nature of these
courts is civil, criminal or some combination remains uncertain.
Though differing in some respects, juvenile courts exist in all
jurisdictions and their importance cannot be minimized. Nationally,
one out of every nine children will be referred to juvenile court for
an act of delinquency before his eightenth birthday. Considering boys
alone, the ratio rises to one out of every sixY
I. TEE EvoLuTIoN OF JuvENrLE TmoRY: Wamwm Do WE Go Arrxa
GAULT?
The realization of separate courts to deal with youthful offenders
is a relatively recent phenomenon. In England and America, until the
twentieth century, a child under seven could not be convicted of a
common law crime since he was supposed incapable of the necessary
mens rea or criminal intent. Between the ages of seven and fourteen,
courts entertained a presumption of incapacity, but the presumption
could be overcome by a showing of sufficient intelligence to know
the difference between right and wrong. Indeed, a reasonably mature
child of eight might be convicted and executed for barn burning.0
The law, however, was not totally without humanity. Courts in
England have long asserted jurisdiction, in equity, over children
considered neglected and dependent. The king was pater patriae or
the ultimate father of all children in the realm and it was this authority
that furnished the basis of jurisdiction in the courts of chancery. Yet
these courts dealt almost exclusively with the protection of children's
property rights. They refused to interfere with the common law courts
in the punishment of youthful criminals. 7 When colonial America in-
herited the English legal system, we extended the jurisdiction of the
equity courts to protect the personal rights of accused children as well
5 Crnnu_'s BUREAu, U. S. DEPT. H. E. W., STAT. SEa. No. 83, JuvENILE
COURT STATImTICS 1 (1967).
6 F. SussMAN & F. BAuM, LAW OF JUVENILE DELINQUENcy 2-3 (3d ed. 1968).
See 4 BLACxSTONE, COMMmTARIES 23-24; H. WADDY, TBE PoLICE COURT AND
ITS WoRx 104-07 (1925).
7 PWISmENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRmE 2
(1967) [hereinafter cited as TAsK FORCE REPORT].
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as their property interests. Otherwise, English juvenile law was carried
over intact.
A. Parens Patriae Theory
In the middle of the nineteenth century, America was deep in the
throes of a social reform movement. Rapid industrialization precipi-
tated not only an increase in scientific knowledge, but a breakup of
family ties and increased youthful deviance from traditional norms.
Though industrialization produced much of the need for reform, it
was the products of industrialization that provided the impetus behind
the reform movement. Men imbued with the spirit of progress harbored
a firm belief in an expanding body of knowledge in the social sciences,
which they began to apply to the increasing problem of deviant be-
havior among juveniles. If the troubled child could be exposed to the
proper treatment; then the environmental influences that produced his
deviant behavior could be unscrambled and a proper cure effected. s
Rehabilitation became the chief goal in the handling of juveniles. 9 In
fact, many reformers so totally identified the interests of society with
the goal of rehabilitation that the community interest in public
security was eclipsed. It was simply inconceivable to these reformers
that inherent limitations could exist in scientific knowledge or avail-
able community resources which would prevent many of these child-
ren from being helped.'0
Early statutes were aimed at segregating juveniles from adults in
prisons and jails. Later, the first reformatory for children was es-
tablished in New York. Massachusetts, in 1880, pioneered the first
probation system, as an alternative to confinement.1" During the last
thirty years of the century, separate hearings were organized for child
offenders in Massachusetts, New York, Indiana, and Rhode Island.'
2
The only major element remaining unaccomplished, the creation of a
separate and distinct juvenile court system, came in 1899 with the
enactment, by the Illinois legislature, of the first juvenile court statute
in the world.' 3 Under that law, the Juvenile Court of Cook County
commenced operations in Chicago. Shortly thereafter, due to the
promotional skill of Judge Ben Lindsay, Colorado followed with a
juvenile court statute,14 and by 1920 only three states had not provided
8 Paulsen, The Child, The Court & The Commission, 18 Juv. Cr. JuoEs J.
79 (1967).
9 M. BAssIouNI & T. Sima., YoUTH N THE LAw 62, 64 (1967).'OF. AL EN, ThE BoanDxD oF Cxnm:NAL JusaicE 45 (1964).
11 SussmuA & BAUm, supra note 6, at 3.
12 Id.
13 Act of April 21, 1899, ILL. LAwS § 21, at 187 (1899).
14 Cor.o. RBr. STAT. ch. 37 (9) (2) (1909).
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such legislation. Today, all states and the District of Columbia have
some version of a juvenile court.1 5 The systems thus established were
anything but a miniature version of the adult criminal courts. The
underlying philosophy, reflecting the reformers' belief that scientific
cures could be effected, is best communicated in a classic article by
Judge Mack:
The problem for determination by the judge is not, has this boy
or girl committed a specific wrong, but what is he, how has he be-
come what he is, and what had best be done in his interest and in
the interest of the state to save him from a downward career....
* . . The judge on a bench, looking down upon the boy standing
at the bar, can never evoke a proper sympathetic spirit. Seated at
a desk, with the child at his side, where he can on occasion put
his arm around his shoulder and draw the lad to him, the judge,
while losing none of his judicial dignity, will gain immensely
in the effectiveness of his work .... 16
This informal tribunal was to be staffed with qualified judges and
specialized medical and psychological personnel. The court was viewed
as a gateway to the child's salvation. Lawyers and other trappings of
the criminal courts were not necessary, because the proceedings were
not adversary in nature. As inheritor of the old chancery courts, the
juvenile courts asserted their jurisdiction as parens patriae, in the name
of the state, instead of the king. The feeling prevailed that the
solicitous care and treatment of a loving father need not be com-
plicated by the due process rights of the child. As a civil court imbued
with special rehabilitative powers, the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment did not apply. This argument, which fended
off constitutional attack in forty separate jurisdictions,17 is in sharp
contrast to present day England where juvenile courts accord all the
protection of criminal procedure to a child accused of delinquency.1 8
B. In re Gault
In 1957 Dean Pound expressed his faith in the juvenile court
system as one of the most significant advances in the administration of
15 For a state by state breakdown see SussAN & BAUM, supra note 6, at
77-86.
16 Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. REv. 104, 120 (1909).
17 See, eg., Ex parte Januszewski, 196 F. 123 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1911). For a
complete collection see Paulsen, Kent v. U.S.: The Constitutional Context of
Juvenile Cases, 1966 Sup. CT. REv. 167, 174 (1966); Note, Misapplication of
Parens Patriae Power in Delinquency Proceedings, 29 IND. L. J. 475, 479-80
(1954).
18 Henriques, Children's Courts In England, 87 J. GluM. L.C. & P.S. 295
(1946).
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justice since the Magna Charta.19 If this conclusion is to survive in
the light of reality, we will have to act quickly to prevent the courts'
total demise. The number of crimes committed by juveniles is dis-
proportionately high in relation to the number of juveniles in the
population. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the ar-
rest of persons under 18 for serious crimes increased by 47 percent
from 1960 to 1965. In 1965 persons under 18 referred to the juvenile
courts constituted 24 percent of all persons charged with forcible
rape, 34 percent of all persons charged with robbery, 52 percent of
all persons charged with larceny, and 61 percent of all persons
charged with auto theft.20 Certainly the problem of juvenile delin-
quency has not been minimized by present court procedures. But let
us not despair from statistics alone. At least we have been providing
the humane and fatherly treatment that our conscience demands. Or
have we?
In 1964 Arizona authorities arrested a 15-year-old boy for making
indecent phone calls to a neighbor.21 The boy, Gerald Gault, was
detained until a hearing could be held; his parents were not notified
of his arrest; he was never confronted with the complaining witness,
nor did she ever appear in court. Without assistance of defense counsel,
the youth was adjudicated delinquent and committed to reform school
until he was 21 years old (six years,' if not released sooner). The
judge stated no reasons for his decision, and no transcript of the
proceedings was prepared. If an adult had committed this same offense
in Arizona, the maximum punishment would have been a fine of $50
or imprisonment in the county jail for no more than two months. Can
less than fair treatment in court be justified on any theory of the
quality of post-dispositional treatment? In view of the youth crime
statistics, mentioned earlier, and the equivalent treatment accorded
adults, the query is dubious on its face. A 1967 report by The
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice [hereinafter referred to as the President's Commission] made
this comment on the problem:
The dispositional alternatives available even to the better endowed
juvenile courts fall far short of the richness and the relevance to in-
dividual needs envisioned by the court's founders. In most places,
indeed, the only alternatives are release outright, probation, and
institutionalization. Probation means minimal supervision at best.
A large percentage of juvenile courts have no probation service at
19 Gums FOR JuVENILE CoUxT JucEs 127 (1957).
20 F.B.I. UNr'oRm CInm REPORTS 28 (1965).21 In Re Gault, 407 P.2d 760 (Ariz. 1965), revd, 887 U.S. 1 (1967).
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all, and in those that do, caseloads typically are so high that
counseling and supervision take the form of occasional phone calls
and perfunctory visits instead of the careful, individualized service
that was intended. Institutionalization too often means storage-
isolation from the outside world-in an overcrowded, under staffed,
high security institution with little education, little vocational train-
ing, little counseling or job placement or other guidance upon
release. Programs are subordinated to everyday control and main-
tenance. Children spend weeks in limbo-like detention, awaiting
bed space. Professor Glueck quotes a well informed penologist:
There are things going on, methods of discipline being used
in the State training schools of this country that would cause a
warden of Alcatraz to lose his job if he used them on his
prisoners. There are practices that are a daily occurence in some
of our State training schools that are not permitted in the
prisons or penitentiaries of the same States. There are many
States in which this discipline is more humane, more reasonable,
in the prison than it is in the State training school.
22
Few venture to suggest that a overly optimistic theory is the sole
cause for failings in the present juvenile court system. But it does seem
valid to suggest that we have yet to accumulate a body of scientific
knowledge sufficient to rehabilitate large numbers of troubled youth.
If an unlimited quantity of money were channeled into the system, it
is still likely that many delinquent children could not be helped.
Nevertheless, the current level of discontent might well have been
lessened by a sufficient community response in the allocation of re-
sources to the juvenile justice system.P
If we conclude, as the Supreme Court did in In Re Gault, that the
treatment goals remain largely unrealized,24 then there can be little
justification for denying the fundamental tenets of due process to
youthful offenders. In theory there was a mutual compact between the
courts and the alleged delinquent. Certain procedural rights were re-
linquished for fatherly treatment and reform. Whatever the reason,
this fictional contract has been broken.25 To a court observer, as to
a child mustered through the process, the impression of a "kangaroo
22 TAsc FoRcE REPOaRT, supra note 7, at 8. The statement of Professor Glueck
quoted therein may be found in Glueck, Unfinished Business in the Management
of Juvenile Delinquency, 15 SYCRAcAsE L. REv. 628, 680 (1964).
23 M. BAssiouNi & T. SmT, supra note 10, at 79-80.
24 See Gault v. United States, 387 U.S. 1, 22 (1967) where the Court stated:
Certainly these figures and the high crime rates among juveniles to which
we have referred, could not lead us to conclude that the absence of
Constitutional protections reduces crime, or that the juvenile system,
functioning free of Constitutional inhibitions as it has largely done, is
effective to reduce crimes or rehabilitate offenders.2 5 Ketchum, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Juvenile Court, 7 Cnam AN
DELNQ. 97 (1961).
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court" is quickly conveyed. Neither probation nor institutionalization
alleviate the original impression.
C. Post Gault Confusion: A Theory in Transition
Concerning the selection of due process guarantees applicable to
juvenile court proceedings, Gault is somewhat ambiguous. As a result
it has often been discussed, but not uniformily understood.2 6 Since at
this point, we are primarily concerned with the theoretical implications
of Gault, the precise holding will be examined later. Speaking for the
majority, Justice Fortas did not conclude that juvenile court theory
was obsolete-only that certain due process guarantees could not be
ignored. In fact few commentators today recommend a total return
to criminal court procedure.2 7 The resulting fusion of parens patriae
and procedural due process is best described by Justice Douglas:
The idea is not the development of a Juvenile Criminal Court.
The idea is not to relegate social workers, analysts, psychiatrists
and others to a lowly position. The idea is to have a healthy
specialized clinic, as the original founders desired; but to have it
surrounded by safeguards so that individualized justice is more
often obtained.
The requirements of procedural due process are only a start.
Beyond that is the staggering problem of community indifference.28
Beyond Gault, juvenile theory is in a period of transition. States
should be groping for much more than accomodation of Supreme
Court guidelines within their present system. The time is ripe for
new approaches to the problems of juvenile delinquency. If states
cannot rejuvenate parens patriae to deal with the problems of a com-
plex society, then revolution will succumb to reaction and the juvenile
will fall heir to the full criminal process. Some contemporary recom-
mendations and novel solutions need to be discussed and evaluated,
but first it is necessary to look at the current system which the juvenile
offender faces in Kentucky.
II. JuvN= COuRT LAw iN KEiT cK
The juvenile court statute in Kentucky, KENTCKY BEWSED STATUTES
[hereinafter referred to as KRS] Chapter 208, has been amended and
2 6 Compare V. NoanDr, GAVLT: WHAT Now FoR THE JuvENmE CouRT? 15-
18 (1968), with BAssiouNr & Snrq., supra note 10, at 76.
27 One of the few recommendations for a return to total criminal procedure
in juvenile court may be Parker, Instant Maturation for Post-Gault "Hood", 4
F2u . L.Q. 113 (1970).2s Douglas, Juvenile Courts and Due Process of Law, 19 Juy. CT. JuDGEs J.
9 (1968).
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revised many times. At present it bears a strong resemblance to the
1959 edition of the Standard Juvenile Court Act. The Standard Act
provided an alternative form for either a state administered system or
one based on individual county or district units. In opting for the latter,
the county courts of Kentucky acquired jurisdiction over any child
under 18 living or apprehended within the county. Each county
wherein the child is a resident, resides, or is found has concurrent
jurisdiction. Subject matter jurisdiction of the juvenile (county)
courts is as broad as anywhere in the nation. With minor exceptions
any of the following can be a basis of jurisdiction: 1) being wayward
or habitually disobedient; 2) being an habitual truant; 3) being
found neglected, dependent, needy or abandoned; 4) having com-
mitted a public offense.
29
The institution of proceedings in juvenile court is by petition, not
complaint. The statute clearly specifies that the petition is to be styled
"in the interest of' the child and not in the nature of a criminal
complaint.30 The placing of a child in custody is not termed an arrest.
Unless the nature of the alleged offense indicates to the contrary, an
officer taking custody is directed to release the youth to his parents
pending a hearing, the only condition being a written promise by the
parents to deliver the child at the specified trial date.31 Bail is not
available. Before disposition the court is directed to conduct an in-
vestigation of the child, which is to include anything that may per-
tain to "his life and character." The written report thus obtained
becomes a part of the proceedings. 32 The adjudicatory hearing itself is
to be informal, with the public to be excluded, although the judge
has some discretion in this area. No trial by jury is allowed.33
If the youth is alleged to have committed a felony while over 16
years of age, or under 16 if the charge is murder, rape or accessory to
murder or rape, the juvenile court can waive jurisdiction. If the
juvenile court does waive jurisdiction, the child would be tried in the
regular criminal courts.34 If convicted of a felony by the circuit court,
he could be sentenced to prison or committed to the Kentucky De-
partment of Child Welfare [hereinafter referred to as the Depart-
ment]35 If the juvenile court retains jurisdiction, the dispositional
alternatives available other than outright release include: 1) probation;
29 KRS § 208.020 (1964) defines both the in personam and subject matter
jurisdiction of juvenile courts in Kentucky.
30KRS § 208.070 (1), (2) (1952).
31KRS § 208.110 (3) (1952).32KRS § 208.140 (1) (1956).
3
3KRS § 208.060 (1952).
34KRS § 208.170 (1) (1962).
35KRS § 208.180 (1) (1962); KRS § 208.170(2)(b) (1962).
[Vol. 59
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2) commitment to the custody of a public or private institution ap-
proved by the Department; 8) commitment to the Department 36 Any
adjudication by the juvenile court, as opposed to a decree in circuit
court, is not to be deemed a conviction, nor is a child who has been
declared delinquent to be deemed a criminal for any purpose.
37
Few direct references are made to the application of procedural
due process, but neither is the proceeding categorized as civil in nature.
In review, it becomes quite apparent that KRS Chapter 208 falls well
within the guidelines of parens patriae theory.
III. OPEATION WrrmN THE STATUTE
Statistically, Kentucky enjoys about the same lack of success in
solving the problems of juvenile delinquency as the national average
would indicate. Beyond the national averages, it has been estimated
that 90 percent of Kentucky youth have committed an act or acts for
which they could have been referred to juvenile court. One out of
every seven males will be referred before his eighteenth birthday.
38
In 1968 alone, 14,088 children were referred to juvenile courts in Ken-
tucky. This figure represents 10,588 different people. Over 40 percent
were charged with acts which would not be a crime if committed by
adults-truancy alone representing 8.2 of the 40 percent.39 As for acts
which would be criminal if committed by adults, juveniles were in-
volved in 40 percent of all arrests for index crimes in Kentucky during
1968.40 In the city of Lexington, 1969 official statistics show that while
206 people were arrested for auto theft, 117 were under 18; of 15
people arrested for forcible rape, 6 were under 18; and among 246
arrested for burglary, 118 were juveniles.41
As elsewhere in the nation, it appears that high rates of juvenile
court referrals are not simply indicative of the rise in juvenile
population. Rather they point to the lack of success in rehabilitation.
In a study entitled Delinquency in Kentucky, the Kentucky Commis-
sion on Law Enforcement and Crime Prevention [hereinafter referred
36KRS § 208.200 (1) (a),(b),(c) (1962).
37 KRS § 208.200 5)(1962).3 8 KENTucKy COMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIME PREVENTION,
CoMxREHENSIVE Cn~mNAr. JusTicE PLAN C-1-9 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
1969 Ky. CRIME CoMm.]
39 1969 Ky. Cnm Comm. C-1-10.40 Ks.rucKy COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND Cnmm PREVENTION,
ComPEIENsrvE CRIMINAL JusncE PLAN 223 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970
Ky. Cwmm Comm.].
41 Statistics compiled by the City of Lexington, Ky. may be found in LEx-
INGTON - FAYETTE COUNTY REGIONAL CIUME COUNCIL, LEXINGTON - FAYETE
CoUNTY CRIMINAL JusTicE PLAN 35-87 (June 1970). A copy has been filed with
the University of Kentucky Law Library.
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to as the Kentucky Crime Commission] has collected statistics which
illustrate that 80 percent of all juveniles treated in our corrective
institutions and returned to the community get into trouble again
within three years.42 Supervised placement (probation) is often not a
viable alternative. Only six courts in Kentucky have their own proba-
tion officers. The Department is able to provide juvenile counselors
for probation services in 48 other counties. The 35 juvenile counselors
of the Department average 50 or more cases at any one time.43 In 66
counties the possibility of probation exists only when volunteers can
be recruited.44
In many instances, the court needs a dispositional alternative
intermediary between probation, which returns the youth to his
former environment, and commitment to an institution. A day treat-
ment center or other half-way house that could serve this function is
non-existent in most instances. Such small-group rehabilitation pro-
jects are considered among the most effective in the nation.45 To best
illustrate the use of presently available resources, the following state-
ment of the Kentucky Crime Commission is most appropriate:
Regretfully, public administration and legislators are much more
inclined to put money into bricks and mortar than into pro-
grams.... It is a sad reality that an administration will probably
get more credit for constructing a building that may not be neces-
sary than for funding a program which is desperately needed.
46
The pertinent inquiry that immediately arises about our juvenile
court statute in Kentucky is very similar to that about other states
operating under parens patriae. If the lack of procedural due process
is not justified, as Gault certainly makes clear, how do we proceed?
What procedures are we required to implement?
IV. SPECI C CoNs'rroNALR RiGrrs Am KRS CHAPTER 208
If there is one area of clarity in this morass of confusion we label
the juvenile justice system, it most certainly is the realization that we
can no longer escape reality by pretending to operate in a civil setting
without need of procedural due process. As we must be aware,
Gault is only the beginning of a sensitive response. It can be argued
42The study, Delinquency In Kentucky is unpublished. See, Kentucky Crime
Commission Emphasize& Greater Community Focus On Delinquency, 21 Jnv. CT.
JUDGE-s J. 11 (1970).
43 1970 Ky. Cinvi CommnssioN, supra note 40, at 123.
44 1969 Ky. Canvm CommssiSoxN, supra note 38, at B-45.
45 1970 Ky. Camm Comr., supra note 40, at 224.46 See note 42 supra.
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that much of the discussion below need not create a statutory prob-
lem in Kentucky. This is a negative argument, resting primarily on
the assumption that KRS Chapter 208 does not prohibit the newly
acquired juvenile rights. Courts might, as the logic of that argument
indicates, read many of the applicable specifics of procedural due
process into the existing statute and thereby retain flexibility for new
extensions or qualifications. Such a piecemeal approach fails to con-
sider the extent to which the entire juvenile process needs fundamental
revamping. Only a comprehensive new code is likely to encompass all
the necessary changes in an intelligible and efficient framework.47
As a strand running throughout the following analysis the reader
should keep in mind that the power of courts could be utilized to pre-
vent incarceration on the basis of inadequate treatment opportunities.
In this manner the community may be aroused to provide the proper
allocation of resources. Bear in mind also that curing defects in
character is subject to the present and/or inherent limitations of
scientific knowledge.
A. Statutory Vagueness
Though the subject matter jurisdiction of our juvenile courts is
broad,48 we are not burdened with an omnibus clause designed to
cover any undesired conduct remaining. Such language as "manifest
danger of falling into habits of vice"49 or "habitually associates with
vicious or immoral persons"50 is not uncommon in other states' statutes.
Within such jurisdictions, a child might well be adjudicated delinquent
and committed to an institution for associating with his prostitute
mother or his monther's business associates. 51 While the language of
KRS section 208.020 is less flowery, it presents the same problems on a
smaller scale. What does it mean to be "wayward" or "habitually dis-
obedient"? How many times is "habitually"? The Gault application of
due process to court procedure should renew the importance of
these questions. At criminal law, statutes are construed narrowly and
it has been suggested that such jurisdictional definitions as Kentucky's
47 Minnesota has promulgated new court rules in place of statutory revision.
See RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR JUVENME COURT PhOCsnGS IN THE MINNESOTA
PROBATE-JUVENILE COURTS (1969), as amended, (Supp. Sept. 1969) [hereinafter
cited as MJCR]. California, Michigan, New Jersey and New York have recently
taken the approach of statutory revision.48 See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
40 CONN. GEN. STAT. AsNN. H§ 17-379 (1960). See Mattiello, v. Conn., 225
A. 2d 507 (Con. App. Div. 1966), cert. denied, 225 A. 2d 201 (Conn. 1966),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 209 (1969).
50TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. Art. 2338-1, § 3 (c) (1925).51 Note, "Delinquent Child" A Legal Term Without Meaning, 21 BAYLOR
L. REV. 352 (1969).
1971] NOTE
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would be unconstitutionally vague.5 2 As early as 1926, the Supreme
Court formulated standards of precision for penal laws that, if applied,
would seemingly invalidate section 208.020:
That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must
be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what
conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalities, is a
well recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions
of fair play and the settled rules of law. And a statute which either
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application, violates the essentials of due process of
law.53
In spite of a general trend to increase the types of conduct sub-
ject to criminal penalities, many authorities have recognized the neces-
sity, on practical grounds, of narrowing the jurisdiction of juvenile
courts.54 In view of the fact that 90 percent of Kentucky youth have
committed acts or pursue a course of conduct for which they could
be prosecuted in juvenile court, 55 the stigma that presently attaches
to "juvenile delinquency" becomes a valid reason for narrowing the
jurisdiction conferred by KRS Chapter 208. It is unfortunate that
people generally equate delinquency with criminality while the statute
based on parens patriae purports to free the individual from the
classification. As the public categorizes an individual it often stamps
his character. The youth soon begins to think of himself in this
manner. If his maturity or character is somewhat unstable he begins to
organize his thoughts and actions as others categorize him. How can
the juvenile court ever become the gateway to rehabilitation until the
proceedings impress those subject to it as fair and equitable? A
juvenile, subject to the court process, finds himself treated as a
criminal, but at the same time denied the fundamental tenets of pro-
cedural due process that normally accompanies a criminal trial.
Separate sessions of court for first offenders and multiple offenders
would help relieve the stigma of delinquency, as would an adequate
fusion of parens patriae with due process. But in the final analysis, it
would be best to keep as many children as possible out of the court
process-at least where society is not substantially endangered thereby.
52 Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. REv. 547, 556
(1957).
53 Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) [emphasis
added].54 See, e.g., Van Tyne, Project 74: Citizen Support for the Court, 19 Juv.
CT. JUDGES J. 31, 33 (1968); TASK FoRcE REPORT, supra note 7, at 2, 97-98.
55 See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
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B. Waiver of jurisdiction
In 1961 police arrested a 16-year-old boy suspected of rape and
robbery. After several hours of questioning, he admitted being in-
volved. He had a prior record. Despite a sworn statement of a
psychologist that Morris Kent had a chronic mental illness, the judge
relinquished jurisdiction to the regular federal criminal courts. No
hearing was held on the waiver and the judge made no findings of
fact. Kent's lawyer was not allowed to examine the file collected and
the waiver order was issued without consultation with either the
boy's lawyer or his mother. After trial, Kent was committed to an
institution for the criminally insane. In addition, he was sentenced to
thirty to ninety years for housebreaking and robbery. Such waiver
proceedings are not uncommon, existing in more than forty states.
The procedure is totally consistent with the modern recognition that
scientific knowledge has not reached the point where all children
can be helped within the juvenile court system. Nevertheless waiver
proceedings are objectionable where used arbitrarily and without
recognition of due process of law. In Kent's case the arbitrariness was
blatant. On review by the Supreme Court, it was decided that a
juvenile is entitled to: 1) a hearing on the issue of waiver; 2) repre-
sentation by counsel at such hearing; 8) consideration by his lawyer
of all the social and probation records; 4) findings of fact by the
judge on the issue of waiver.56 Unfortunately this case arose in the
District of Columbia and did not concern rights applicable to state
waiver procedures via the fourteenth amendment. Since the later case
of Gault dealt only with the adjudicatory stage of the juvenile process,
many states remain uncertain about constitutionally required pro-
cedures as to waiver.
The waiver procedure provided in KRS section 208.170 is silent on
any safeguards. The decision to transfer a case to the regular criminal
courts is in the discretion of the judge. No standards are provided
beyond the broad admonition to consider the "best interests of the
child." Shortly after Kent v. United States, the Kentucky Court de-
cided Smith v. Commonwealth.57 Evidently considering Kent as
persuasive authority, Smith absorbed that decision.58 As most other
appellate courts, Kentucky refused to apply Kent retroactively.59
56 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
5 7412 S.W.2d 256 (Ky. 1967).
581967-68 Court of Appeals Review, 56 Ky. L.J. 360, 363 (1967).
59 See generally Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966). See also State
v. Hance, 233 A.2d 326 (Md. 1967); Cradle v. Peyton, 156 S.E.2d 874 (Va.
1967).
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Though the constitutional validity of section 208.170 is beyond debate
due to Kent and Smith the Section has outstanding weaknesses that
persist. Criteria are badly needed to guide the juvenile courts. Too
often the court may decide against waiver merely because the parents
can afford to send the child to a private school outside the community.
Judges are well aware of the lack of personnel and the non-existence
of certain facilities, and as a result, the waiver decision too often
reflects the economic status of the parents. At the same time great
community pressure is usually brought to bear on the court when a
serious crime has been committed. Under such circumstances it is
hard to deny waiver, regardless of prospects for rehabilitation, when
the waiver decision rests in the judge's discretion. Statutory guide-
lines will not altogether alleviate this problem, but they can at least
assure the consideration of objective criteria other than the seriousness
of the offense or the economic status of the juvenile's parents. °
C. Right to Bail
KRS section 208.110 specifically provides that bail is not applicable
when a youth is detained for juvenile court, which is consistent with
the remainder of the section. If the arresting officer is directed to
release the child to his parents, unless the circumstances indicate a
necessity to do otherwise, then theoretically there would be little
need of bail. But this type of parens patriae rationale is in the dis-
repute, and Kentucky is presently one of only three states that in-
clude such a provision in their statute.61 Gault did not consider this
problem and the Supreme Court has yet to rule on the subject, but
the right to bail did arise recently in Fulwood v. Stone,62 under a
statute much like Kentucky's. That court held the statute, in dis-
couraging removal from the parents, to be an adequate substitute for
bail. Apparently Kentucky would agree with the rationale. But when
the question arose in Smith v. McCravy,63 the Jefferson County Circuit
Court found a constitutional right to bail, the decision coming only
eleven days after Gault. It has not resulted in an amendment to section
208.110. From the standpoint of Gault the McCravy decision seems
60 Adetailed listing of criteria applicable to a waiver of jurisdiction may be
found in T x. Civ. STAT. ANN. Art. 2338-1, § 6(b)-(f) (Supp. 1968).
61 See Note, The Right to Bail & the Pre-"Triar' Detention of Juveniles
Accused of Crime, 18 VAND. L. REv. 2096, 2096-2100 (1965).
62 394 F.2d 939 (D.C. Cir. 1967). For an analysis of the case see 2 CnRW.
L. RPmR. 2196 (1967).
6 No. 108809, Jefferson Co. (Ky.) Cir. Ct., May 26, 1967. The decision is
noted in 1 Jnv. CT. DiGEsT 5 (Nov. 1967).
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more in line with Supreme Court guidelines, and it may be only a
matter of time until Gault is extended to cover this area.
D. Conduct of the Hearing
The precise area of concern in Gault was the adjudicatory hearing.
Technically its holding is limited to this stage of the juvenile process.
1. In Re Gault: Notice of the Charges
The child and his parents or guardian must be given written notice
of the charges against him, sufficiently in advance of trial to allow
for the preparation of a defense. The notice must set forth the charges
with particularity. Chapter 208 provides for notice of the hearing but
not for a notice of the charges,64 although such information is usually
included in the petition, a copy of which is forwarded to the parents.
But that is not to say that all courts in the state provide the requisite
notice in all cases. The real conflict comes with the second portion of
the notice requirement. It may be quite impossible to state way-
wardness, or other courses of conduct with particularity. While it
would seem wise to include a better provision for notice in the
statute, the future may see the jurisdiction of juvenile court limited to
public offenses, or at least considerably narrowed. The latter would,
of course, eliminate the "particularity" problem.65
2. In Re Gault: Bight to Counsel, Bight to Remain Silent,
Confrontation of Witnesses.
A fair reading of Gault would suggest that in any adjudicatory
hearing where the freedom of the juvenile is involved, the court must
inform him of his right to retained counsel or appointed counsel if he
cannot afford one. The small paragraph on conduct of hearings in
Chapter 208 is of little help. 6 It is not suggested in our statute that
counsel may participate in informal juvenile court hearings, though
such is now the case. Not until 1968 did the Court of Appeals
recognize that juvenile court must appoint counsel in indigency
cases. 67
64 For notice of hearing requirements see KRS § 208.080 (1) (1953).
65 Suggestions for narrowing juvenile court jurisdiction will be discussed in
detail in Part V of the text.
66KRS § 208.060 (1953).
67 Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. 1968), held that life
imprisonment without benefit of parole is cruel and unusual punishment when ap-
plied to juveniles. It also recognized that if the hearing was held today ap-
pointment of counsel would be necessary, but the Court refused to apply Gault
retroactively.
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It seems likely that the right to counsel will not begin and cease
with the hearing. At least this is implicit in Gault:
The juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to cope with problems
of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon
regularity of the proceedings, and to ascertain whether he has a
defense and to prepare and submit it. The child requires the
guiding hand of counsel at every step of the proceedings against
him.68
Ordinarily arrest and interrogation are the points at which the
juvenile process begins to focus on a particular person. Logically this
is a step in the proceedings against the accused. It should follow
that notice of the right to counsel begins at this point in accordance
with the Miranda requirements. 69 Of necessity, the right to counsel,
either at hearings or arrest, focuses attention on the manner in which
the requirement can be effectively waived. Because of the age and
impressionable character of youthful offenders, they are especially
susceptible to persistent interrogation. Minority alone will probably
not invalidate a waiver or subsequent confession.70 As with adults,
maturity and education will be factors, along with the court's view of
the manner of interrogation which the police used.71 Yet it has been
held that both parent and child must consent to waiver during inter-
rogation if any resulting evidence is to be admissible.72 This is the
position taken by recent statutes and court rules of procedure.73 Dif-
ficult problems are raised, however, if the parent and child are ad-
verse. It may be that in such instances the court should examine the
waiver even more closely.
When dealing with the admissibility of confessions, the cases
generally are referring to waiver of the right to remain silent as well
as the right to counsel. As Gault pointed out, even where the juvenile
is concerned, both rights go hand in hand. The time at which these
Constitutional guarantees attach in Kentucky is pure conjecture,
6 8 1n Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1967), quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45, 69 (1932) [emphasis added].
69 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). For a discussion of the ap-
plication of Miranda rights in juvenile court see In Re Creek, No. 4320, D.C.
App., June 10, 1968; Note, Application of Gault: Its Effect On Juvenile Delin-
quency Proceedings In Texas, 20 BA YLOR L. Rv. 113 (1967); Comment, In ReGault: Juvenile Notice, A Proposal For Reform, 47 OrnE. L. BEv. 166 (1968).7 0 1See Jones v. State, 166 S.E.2d 617 (Ga. 1969).
See Smith v. Grouse, 413 F.2d 979 (10th Cir. 1969); Phillips v. Smith,
300 F. Supp. 130 (S.D. Ga. 1969); Commonwealth v. Tabb, 249 A.2d 546(Pa. 1969); State v. Lewis, 468 P.2d 899 (Ore. 1970).
72 Freeman v. Wilcox, 167 S.E.2d 163 (Ga. 1969).
7 3See, e.g., MJCR Rule 1-5 (3)(b); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1109
(Supp. 1968-69).
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though the implications of Gault logically point to the arrest. The
entire question of waiver remains undetermined.
The participation of lawyers partially raises the veil of secrecy that
normally surrounds juvenile court proceedings. As participation in-
creases, serious inquiry must be made about the role lawyers are to
play. Attorneys are accustomed to presenting every possible defense,
which may involve supressing a confession or other evidence, which
was illegally obtained. But if parens patriae is still to have any mean-
ing, and if juvenile courts are not to be relegated entirely to the status
of a junior criminal court, then counsel owes a distinct duty to the child
believed in need of treatment. The attorney's role is only complicated
by the realization that treatment is often under par. The new Code of
Professional Responsibility provides little assistance, as it deals pri-
marily with lawyers engaged in an adversary process.7 4 The Court of
Appeals or the General Assembly needs desperately to define the
lawyers role more fully. It may be that the legal profession must face
the unique challenge of acting both as advocate and as counselor. If
so, we are ill equipped without a background in child psychology.7 5
Only brief mention need be made of the accused's sixth amend-
ment right to confront the witness against him. In Gault, the complain-
ing witness never testified or appeared in court. As a result the right
of confrontation was an express holding of the Supreme Court. But
Chapter 208 is not as clear, "The presence of the child in court may
be waived by the court at any stage of the proceedings."76 The
ostensible purpose of such language may be to allow the proceeding
to continue when the child becomes extremely disruptive, a situation
not altogther unfamiliar in the last several years. If this interpretation
be accepted the provision is undoubtedly valid under the recent
Supreme Court decision in State v. Allen.77 Under any other interpreta-
tion it is difficult to see how this language could withstand con-
stitutional scrutiny.
3. Evidentiary Problems
Many questions remain unanswered by Gault. As the complete
discrediting of the parens patriae theory was carefuly avoided, the
states were left with the following admonition:
7 4 AMEIcAN BAR ASS'N, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RBESPONSiBU..TY Canon V(1969).7 For an excellent discussion of the lawyer's role in juvenile court see
Haviland, Daddy Will Take Care of You: The Dichotomy of The Juvenile
Court, 17 KA. L. Rnv. 317 (1969); Shaler, The Right To Counsel and The
Role of Counsel In Juvenile Court Proceedings, 48 IND. L. REv. 558 (1968).
76 KRS § 208.060 (1953).
77 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
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We do not mean .. to indicate that the hearing to be held must
conform with all the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the
usual administrative hearing; but we do hold that the hearing
must measure up to the essentials of due proces and fair treat-
ment.78
Chapter 208 does not inform us what reports the defense may
obtain from the police, institutions, probation officers, or social workers.
KRS section 208.830 provides for the confidentiality of various records
but makes no mention of defense inspection-except "by leave of the
county judge." If lawyers are to participate in the hearing, the Court
of Appeals or the General Assembly must provide objective guidelines
on juvenile discovery. At present the subpoena of witneses may be the
only way, outside the whim of public officials, to obtain information
essential to a competent defense. The admissibility of hearsay and ir-
relevant statements are examples of equally pressing evidentiary prob-
lems that beset this strange admixture of a civil and a criminal court.
They are dearly illustrative of the need to fashion a body of rules to
meet the special requirements of juvenile court.
79
The standard of proof aspect, untouched by Gault, has recently
received considerable attention. Chapter 208, like most juvenile court
statutes, does not specify a measure of proof. Traditionally, it was as-
sumed that in a civil court, established as parens patriae, a "pre-
ponderance of the evidence" would suffice. 0 Since Gault, increased
dialogue and debate has resulted in a split among the authorities.8 '
The Fourth Circuit held, in United States v. Costazo, 12 that the criminal
standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt" was applicable if there was
any possibility that the child would be deprived of his freedom. A
similiar conclusion was reached by the Illinois court in 1968.P It was
felt by the Illinois court that the "spirit" of Gault required consistency
78387 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1967), quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541,
562 (1966).
79For a good analysis of a full body of evidentiary rules see Minnesota
Juvenile Court Rules Symposium-Standards of Proof and Admissibility in
Juvenile Court Proceedings, 54 MmN. L. REv. 362, 378 (1969).80U.S. v. Borders, 154 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Ala. 1957); In Re Yardley,
149 S.W.2d 162 (Iowa 1967); In Re McDonald, 153 A.2d 651 (D.C. Mun. Ct.
App. 1959); In Re Barkus, 95 N.W. 674 (Neb. 1959); Bryant v. Brown, 118 So.
184 (Miss. 1928); People v. Lewis, 183 N.E. 853 (N.Y. 1932), cert. denied, 289
U.S. 709 (1933); State v. Thompson, 275 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. 1955). But see, In
Re Rich, 86 N.Y.S.2d 308 (Doam. Rel. Ct. 1949); In Re Madik, 251 N.Y.S. 765
(App. Div. 1931); Jones v. Commonwealth, 38 S.E.2d 444 (Va. 1946).
s1 See Cohen, The Standard of Proof In Juvenile Proceedings: Gault Beyond
A Reasonable Doubt, 68 MicH. L. REv. 567 (1970); Pedigo, Standard of Proof
In Juvenile Delinquency Adjudications: New York Takes the Narrow View, 9
J. FAmLY L. 316 (1970).
823 95 F.2d 441 (4th Cir. 1968).
83 In Re Urbasek, 232 N.E.2d 716 (11. 1968).
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with the criminal standard. Contrary positions were taken by the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 4 Texas,8 5 and New York.8 6
Only last year was the confusion eliminated. After declining to resolve
the issue in two recent cases,87 the Supreme Court handed down In
re Winship in March, 1970.88 Drawing heavily on Gault, the Supreme
Court again compared juvenile court proceedings, where institutiona-
lization is a possibility, to a felony prosecution. Proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is now an essential of due process and fair treatment.
It cannot be denied by a "civil" label of convenience.
4. Public Hearings
Chapter 208 provides for "informal" hearings and the exclusion of
the public in the discretion of the court.89 This is the very essence of
parents patriae theory. To many its elimination could only indicate
the total demise of traditional theory which the Gault court so care-
fully side-stepped. The sixth amendment guarantees a public trial-
perhaps ironically for the protection of the defendant. This guarantee
has been applied to the states via the fourteenth amendment.90 As
yet it has not been formally extended to the juvenile courts, however
it may be that local juvenile courts in Kentucky are formulating
policies implimenting the sixth amendment. In spite of Chapter 208
theory, the Fayette County Court (session for second offenders)
recently opened its doors to reporters. 91 They moved into a public
courtroom where the judge donned his black robe, and seated himself
behind the bench "looking down upon the boy." Judge Mack would
literally turn over in his grave were he aware of such routine in
juvenile courts. 92 The Fayette County Judge also announced that the
names of second offenders, and first offenders if the charges were rape
or murder, would be released to newspapers. This breaks a long-
standing tradition against publication in Fayette County. It is a trend
of the times that many are coming to believe that justice is better
served wih added formality. Regardless of whether formality induces
respect for the law, it may indeed be necessary for a real implementa-
tion of procedural due process.
841In Re Wylie, 231 A.2d 81 (D.C. 1967).
8 5 State v. Santana, 444 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. 1968).
861In Re W. v. Family Court, 299 N.Y.S.2d 414 (N.Y.Ct.App. 1969).
8 7 In re Whittington, 891 U.S. 341 (1968); DeBacker v. Brainard, 896 U.S.
28 (1969).
883 97 U.S. 858 (1970).
89 KRS § 208.060 (1958).
90 In re Oliver, 833 U.S. 257 (1948); People v. Jelke, 123 N.E.2d 769
(N.Y. 1954).
91 Lexington Leader, Sept. 18, 1970, at 1, col. 2.
92 See note 16 supra and accompanying test.
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E. Trial by jury
KRS section 208.060 provides: "All cases involving children shall
be dealt with by the juvenile court at separate hearings and without
a jury." [Emphasis added.] Even in criminal cases, the Supreme Court
has never obligated the states to recognize the jury trial guarantees of
the sixth and seventh amendments. It has long been considered that
such a proceedure was not in the "essence" of a "scheme of ordered
liberty" and therefore not fundamental to due process. 93 But specula-
tion on the post-Gault trend has revived the issue, and a number of
states have found provisions similiar to section 208.060 under attack
Recent court decisions have revealed a split on the issue.94 In Dryden
v. Commonwealth,95 the Kentucky Court reiterated its traditional
acceptance of parens patriae. The Court granted that the logic of
newly applied constitutional rights would seem to impel a recognition
of jury trial in juvenile court, but drawing on its own experience the
Court felt, as did Justice Holmes, that logic is not the life of the law.
The Court's experience indicated that:
A jury trial, with all the clash and clamor of the adversary system
that necessarily goes with it, would certainly invest a juvenile pro-
ceedings with the appearance of a criminal trial, and create in the
mind and memory of the child the same effect as if it were. In our
opinion there is more to be lost than gained. Certainly we cannot
regard a jury as a better, fairer, more accurate fact-finder than a
competent and conscientious circuit judge. There may be some
judges who do not fit this description, but neither do all juries.96
Considering the required qualifications of juvenile judges in this
state, the Court's experience may belittle the truth.9r Yet accepting
this rationale as consistent with KRS Chapter 208 and traditional
parens patriae theory, it does not appear consistent with the polices
of some local juvenile courts which have opened hearings to the
public.
Undoubtedly the last word on trial by jury in juvenile court is yet
to be expresed. The precise question was posed to the Supreme Court
93 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 324-29 (1937).94 Courts recognizing a Constitutional right to trial by jury are: Nieves v.
United States, 280 F. Supp. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Peyton v. Nord, 437 P.2d 716
(N.M. 1968); In re Rindell, 2 Cn. L. Ra. 3121 (Providence, R.L Farn. Ct.
1968). Courts not recognizing a right to trial by jury are: In re Johnson, 255
A.2d 419 (Md. 1969); In re State ex rel. J.W., 254 A.2d 334 (Union Co., NJ.
Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1969); People v. K., 296 N.Y.S.2d 404 (Kings Co. Sup.
Ct. 1968); In re Burres, 167 S.E.2d 454 (N.C. 1969); State v. Turner, 453 P.2d
910 (Ore. 1969).
95 435 S.W.2d 457 (Ky. 1968).
96 Id. at 461.
97 See note 32 supra, and accompanying text for a discussion of the qualifica-
tions for the office of county judge.
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in DeBacker v. Brainard,8 but the case was dismissed as inappropriate
to decide the issue. In view of Gault, the outlook appears bleak for
Dryden. The Supreme Court appears to be looking for an appropriate
case to settle the issue. Probable jurisdiction has recently been noted
in two Pennsylvania cases dealing with the denial of a trial by jury
demand, and both cases have been consolidated for hearing.99
F. Transcript and Appellate Review
When these issues were raised in Gault, the Supreme Court de-
clined to pass on them. Like the issue of trial by jury, it has been
widely supposed that the Constitution does not require the states to
establish an appellate court system-it is not an essential of due
process. Since Gault was argued under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, it would have been a singularly inappropriate
vehicle to require an appellate system for juvenile courts. Perhaps the
result would be quite different if the question were raised under the
equal protection clause. When states provide such procedure for
adults, it may be necessary to give equal opportunity to youthful
citizens. In Kentucky, a record of the proceedings (usually a few notes
by the court clerk) is required and an appeal is provided to the
circuit court.100 It is not possible for an appeal to lie in the Court of
Appeals unless the circuit court has erronously refused jurisdiction.101
Though the procedure is laudable it may yet be found wanting. There
appears to be little reason for denying a full transcript free of charge
and review by the Court of Appeals. If Gault is extended in this area
by way of the equal protection clause, the existence of a different ap-
pellate procedure in adult courts would probably be a major factor
influencing the decision. Further, it would not be surprising to fina
that a "record" is not sufficient for appellate review. A comparison of
juvenile court procedure to that of a felony prosecution could neces-
sitate a statement of the judges findings of fact, if not his conclusions
of law. 02 Revision of Chapter 208 in these particulars would seem
appropriate at this time.
This foregoing analysis of constitutional problems with Kentucky
law was not intended to be exhaustive. Indeed, such an exposition of
98396 U.S. 28 (1969).
99 In re Terry, 265 A.2d 350 (Pa. 1970) and In re McKeiver, 265 A.2d 350
(Pa. 1970), prob. juris. noted, 90 S.Ct. 2271 (1970), noted in 2 Jrv. CT. DIGEST
6 (1970).
100 KRS § 208.040 (1953).
101 KRS § 208.380 (1963). See Brewer v. Commonwealth, 283 S.W.2d 702
(Ky. 1955).
102 Kent made such a comparison and required the judge to specify findings
of fact in a waiver hearing.
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the juvenile court in transition would necessarily extend to book
length. It is meant to deliniate specific problem areas that need im-
mediate attention. There are other areas of Chapter 208 equally in
need of revamping, though they are not so closely linked with recent
extensions of due process. It is to these problems we now turn.
V. NoN-CONSTITUTIONAL PRoBLEMs wiTr KRS CHApRm 208
A. Juvenile Court Judges: The County System
The juvenile session of the county court . . . shall have exclusive
jurisdiction in proceedings concerning any child .... 3
The county judge is a constitutional officer elected to a four-year
term. His duties may well be more complex than any other state
official. Presiding over regular misdemeanor courts, preliminary hear-
ings for felonies, probate court, civil court in cases involving less than
$500, and fiscal court, the administrative agency of the county, his
duties as juvenile court judge often receive the least of his attentions.
He can appoint trial commissioners to relieve him of much of the
burden, but this has been accomplished in only nine counties con-
taining first and second class cities. Until 1968 other counties could
offer a trial commissioner only $50 per annum.104 A major weakness
in the county system has always been financial inability. In more
populated areas where funds are available the workload is immense
and continually expanding. Seldom does capacity keep up with the
docket. On the other hand, it is highly impractical to operate juvenile
courts in smaller counties due to an insufficient volume of work These
considerations have led the National Probation and Parol Association
to recommend a system of state administered courts. With the
financial picture and complexity of the office as a backdrop, it is
understandable that qualified people might shun the opportunity to
be county judge. The problem is considerably magnified, from the
standpoint of finding qualified judges, by the absence of substantive
qualifications on a judge's background. The sole requirement in
Kentucky is having reached 24 years of age.105 Not only is it possible
to be lacking in a gackground of child psychology, but one need not
be an attorney. In fact, only twelve of the 120 county judges in 1965
were members of the Kentucky bar.10 It is interesting to compare
Kentucky's requirements for county judge with the text book quali-
fications of a juvenile court judge alone:
103 KRS § 208.020(1) (1964).
104 1969 Ky. CRimE ComM., supra note 38, at B-42.
10 5 Ky. CoNsT. § 100.
106 1969 Ky. Citm Comm., supra note 38, at A-9-b.
[Vol. 59
NoTE
It seems clear that to be effective, the juvenile court judge requires
not only thorough training in law but a sound grasp of what is
knoun about human behavior, especially as this knowledge relates
to child development and adolescence. In addition, since an
effective juvenile court system will provide many alternative dis-
positions, the judge must be skilled and knowledgable in the uses
of these resources.
All these requirements mean that the juvenile court judge has
a more complex job to do than most judges in courts of original
jurisdiction. It is a common feeling among a large number of
juvenile court judges that when they begin handling juvenile court
cases they are almost totally unprepared for the functions they
must perform and the decisions they must make .... 107
In 1965 the General Assembly authorized the Department of Child
Welfare to sponsor annually a Kentucky Conference of Juvenile
Court Judges. os Among the stated purposes of the Conference was
the training of judges, but to date participation is entirely voluntary.
Although efforts should be made to extend such a program, realistically
there is little excuse for a non-lawyer exercising judicial authority or
for a juvenile judge to be lacking a background in child psychology.
B. Detention
Concerning ourselves primarily with statutory problems, there are
two areas dealing with detention in Chapter 208 that are of particular
concern. The 1968 General Assembly provided that in every county
containing a city of the first or second class a permanent detention
home for juveniles must be supported by the fiscal court of that
county.109 The purpose of such a facility is "detention of children held
in custody pending disposition."110 It is well known that children
often receive their first real contact with hardened delinquents or
adult criminals while awaiting trial. Experiences in jail may create
impressions impossible to erase. That the prevention of such contact
was the evident goal of the legislature is supported by a pre-existing
statutory provision. KRS section 208.120 specifically provides that no
child under 16 years of age shall be detained in jail, "except on the
basis of a hearing for that purpose." The Kentucky Crime Commission
has found that both the above described provisions of KRS Chapter
208 are almost universally ignored. Permanent detention homes have
been established in only four counties. In the other 116 counties, jail
107 Wheeler & Cottrell, Juvenile Delinquency: Its Prevention and Control, in
CASES AND MA TEiALs RELATon To JuvENILE CouRTs 420, 425-26 (Ketcham &
Paulsen ed. 1967) [emphasis added].
108 KRS § 208.555 (1968).
101 KRS § 208.130 (2) (1968).
11OKRS § 208.130 (1) (1968).
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is usually the only facility for detention, though some effort is usually
made to segregate juveniles from adults."'
Even in the counties with permanent detention homes, the spirit of
the statute may not be followed. Kincaid Home, in Fayette County, is
without decent security provisions. When the child is considered a
security risk he is often placed in the county jail, an atrocious place
even for adults. Juveniles are quartered on the third floor of this out-
moded facility with their mattresses spread out across the floor. It is
sad indeed that a leaky pup tent in the rain might be preferable.
There is literally no excuse for not uniformly enforcing the mandate
of the legislature in these circumstances.
Our second area of concern deals with another enactment of the
1968 General Assembly. It has been provided that any county may ar-
range with the Department for use of regional reception-diagnostic
centers "for those cases pending before the juvenile court of its
county."" 2 The problem is that two years after the effective date of the
statute no such facilities exist. Only two are presently beyond the
planning stage. The proposed Northern Kentucky Reception-Diagnostic
Center is scheduled to open in July, 1971. Its present stage of com-
pletion is that the site has been purchased. There is an estimated
capacity of only fifty patients. Its counterpart in western Kentucky has
not yet acquired a building site." 3 If completed, regional centers
would be a major contribution to rehabilitation programs.
CONCLUSION: ALTEoRNATIVE IzPI'RovMENTS AN SUGGESTIONS
We have presently arrived at a point in our analysis that may be
termed a convergence. Having begun by tracing the evolution of
juvenile theory to the contemporary stage of confusion and transition,
we diverged from theoretical discussion to consider the position of
Kentucky law along that path of evolution. Kentucky, like most other
states, is groping to accomodate parens patriae theory with procedural
due process, and to increase the effectiveness of the juvenile justice
system. This is the essence of the post-Gault stage of transition. These
dual themes must now converge to more fully consider the future di-
rection of needed revision in the system of juvenile justice.
The most comprehensive suggestions for improvement within
parens patriae are put forward by the President's Commission. Briefly
summarized they are: 1) a narrowing of juvenile court jurisdiction; 2)
M1 1969 Ky. Cnmmx COMM., supra note 38, at B-43.
212 KRS § 208.130(6) (1968).
"3 1970 Ky. CBnmi Comm., supra note 38, at 135-36.
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a formalizing of pre-judicial settlements; 3) the creation of a "youth
services bureau" to handle less serious referrals; 4) a division of
juvenile court into an "adjudicatory hearing" and a "dispositional
hearing"; and 5) the full utilization of due process requirements in the
adjudicatory hearing.114 These suggestions represent the realization
that an adjudication of delinquency is a stigma that should only be
utilized as a last resort. Many children now mustered through the
judical process can best be dealt with informally, through social
agencies, and out of court. Statistics defy the old theory that the court
is a gateway to rehabilitation. At the same time, not all juveniles can
be effectively treated without institutionalization. Those children will
be filtered into the court system, where the community interest in
public security must be balanced with the rehabilitative goal. This
does not mean a complete divorce of such ends. The most practical
method of achieving a recognition of all these interests is by an ad-
judicatory hearing, where the defendant receives the full protections
of procedural due process. If the youth is found delinquent, a second
hearing is necessitated. Here the questions involving the best interests
of the child can be decided less formally, but within objective guide-
lines.
Subject matter jurisdiction of the Kentucky juvenile courts is far
too broad. Disobedience to the parent is best handled through social
agencies not involving the stigma of criminality. The same is true of
the courts' dependency jurisdiction. Social agencies are better equipped
to deal with the non-willful failure of parents to care for children.
Neglect falls into another category. Because it involves the "right"
to custody and not financial inability, the President's Commission
specifically recommends it be retained. Not all authorities agree that
narrowing the court's jurisdiction is sound. The 1968 version of the
proposed Uniform Juvenile Court Act simply restructured definitions
in an apparent effort to avoid the stigma of delinquency. Dependent
children are to be called "deprived children" and disobediency juris-
diction is retained under the label "unruly children."" 5 The Uniform
Act approach appears to be only a superficial one-more of a compro-
mise to obtain acceptance than a real effort at meeting the challenge.
"Intake" in the juvenile court context is a process of screening to
determine what individuals referred to the court should be processed.
114 REPORT OF THE PsmIDEN'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SocIETY
55-88 (1967) [hereinafter cited as THE CHALLENE OF CRImE].115 Arther, The Uniform Juvenile Court Act, 19 Juv. CT. JUDGES J. 153
(1969).
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It exists by statue in 42 states, including Kentucky.," If such a process
were limited to a determination of proper jurisdiction, if any, or
whether available proof justifies a hearing, then it could be appro-
priately defended on the grounds of practical necessity. But as it
presently exists, probation officers, policemen, and prosecutors can to-
gether declare informal probation without the necessary participation
of parents or attorneys. After the preliminary investigation, Chapter
208 specifies, "Thereupon the court may make such informal adjust-
ment as is practicable without a petition .... "11 This arbitrary
decision-making process has been soundly criticized for the lack of
objective written criteria essential to maintain even a semblance of
consistency.118 But in spite of its weaknesses, the intake system has
the potential to avoid the processing of children when not essential to
the maintenance of public order. To safeguard the procedure, the
President's Commission suggests extensive use of preliminary con-
ferences. In this semi-formal setting the judge, the complaining witness,
the youth, the parents, and the lawyer can make fullest use of in-
formal disposition, and at the same time negotiations would be in the
open and more conducive to respect. Written consent decrees should
be available to explicitly state the terms and conditions of probation
or other disposition. As a last resort, a petition could be filed invoking
a juvenile court hearing. For those individuals loosely categorized as
repeaters, institutionalization would be a significant possibility. A full
adjudcatory hearing with all the rudiments of due process should be
provided. The hopes of parens patriae theorists might still be salvaged
by a separate dispositional hearing to consider the best interest of the
child and the community. Here at least, an informal hearing is at once
feasible and preferable. The best available scientific knowledge can
be introduced in a setting functionally appropriate. Hopefully the
child will have fewer premonitions about being railroaded through an
arbitrary system.
The Kentucky Crime Commission has, to a large extent, adopted
the theory, if not all the recommendations, of the President's Com-
mission. Most significantly the President's Commission sought the
establishment of Youth Service Bureaus. These local facilities would
normally take referrals from police, the court, schools, and parents on
a voluntary basis. It would provide a broad range of neighborhood
services to both delinquent and non-delinquent youth. The less serious
16 For a complete listing see Ferster, Courtless & Snethen, Separating
Official And Unofficial Delinquents: Juvenile Court Intake, 55 IowA L. Rxv. 866
n.9 (1970).
"1KRS § 208.070 (1963).
118 TnE CHALLENGE oF CpImE, supra note 114, at 86-88.
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cases screened out of the juvenile court system could be particularly
served by such agencies. The 1969 annual report of the Kentucky
Crime Commission states:
Although the greatest hope of delinquency prevention lies in
comprehensive and effective local action, few communities are
developing preventive programs, and there is too little coordination
of the public agencies on the local level and of these agencies with
private agencies and volunteer programs.
Goal: The establishment of youth service bureaus which would
mobilize all the resources of the community and coordinate existing
agencies to:
1) Find means of ameliorating the social and psychological prob-
lems of children (and their families) before these problems cause
asocial personalities and deviant behavior, and;
2) Divert from the juvenile justice system those youths, who are
in greater need of social services than court processing, and see
to it that those youths receive those services."19
The 1970 Kentucky Crime Commission report indicated a continua-
tion of that project. In 1969 four local bureaus were funded along with
a central office coordinator in the Department. 120 Such services will
undoubtedly cost a great deal of money and take years to establish.
Though some consider it a diversion, 121 it is a commendable effort to
provide for the future as well as the present.
The recommendations of the President's Commission appear ex-
tensive, yet they do operate without fundamental changes in the court
system. Many foreign countries have been less reluctant to alter form
to fit function. The 1964 Kilbrandon Report in Scotland recommended
abolition of juvenile courts altogether. 2 2 Upon apprehension the child
would be taken to a newly constituted social agency. He would be
asked if he committed the suspected acts. In cases of denial, the child
would be sent to the regular sheriff's court for trial. If found guilty, he
would be returned to the social agency for disposition, with this
agency possessing the sole responsibility to determine subsequent
supervision and treatment. Practically speaking, the goals outlined in
Kilbrandon are similar to those of the President's Commission. A more
radical approach is proposed in the British whitepaper entitled The
119 1969 Ky. CRiME ComM., supra note 38, at A-10 [emphasis added].
120 1970 Ky. CrNm Comm., supra note 40, at 224-25.
121 A searching criticism of "Youth Service Bureaus" can be found in Rubin
& Smith, The Future of the Juvenile Court: Implications For Correctional Man-
power and Training, 19 Juv. CT. JuDGES 1. 98 (1968).
' 22 See CommentarJ Upon & Excerpts From Kilbrandon Committee Report,
Children end Young Persons, in CASES AND Mxr-nuiS RELATING To JUVENME
CouRTs, supra note 107, at 436.
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Child, The Family and The Youth Offender.123 All children under
sixteen would be eliminated from the jurisdictions of courts. They
would be referred to local community councils of social workers and
experienced laymen. Only when the facts were disputed would the
case be transferred to the courts. The extensive use of lay penals in
England and many of the Scandinavian countries serve much the
same function as the President's Commission envisions for the pre-
liminary conference. They are effective screening processes for the
juvenile courts. But further, they usually possess the power to deal
with disobediency, truancy, and dependency without the adjudication
of a court.' 24
Were the General Assembly to revise Chapter 208 along the lines
indicated, there would still be one glaring defect in the structure of
juvenile court itself. Even eliminating the perennial problems of money
and facilities, the court would be operating under a fundamental mis-
conception that prevents optimum success. The defect is most suc-
cinctly phrased in this statement by Dean Pound:
It has been pointed out more than once of late that a juvenile court
passing on delinquent children; a court of divorce jurisdiction
entertaining a suit for divorce, alimony, and custody of children; a
court of common-law jurisdiction entertaining an action for neces-
saries furnished to an abandoned wife by a grocer; and a criminal
court or domestic relations court in prosecutions for desertion of
a wife and child-that all of these courts might be dealing piece-
meal at the same time with the difficulties of the same family.125
Family court proposals are not new. For over fifty years legal com-
mentators and authorities in many fields have urged their legislators
to deal with the problems of a declining institution, the family. Only
recently have such courts been organized state-wide in Hawaii,
Rhode Island, New York, and Pennsylvania.126 It is apparent that the
quest for effective modes of preventing delinquent behavior will
eventually lead to the realization that the whole family problem needs
attention. Removal of the juvenile courts in Kentucky to the circuit
123 See GREAT BUrAN HoMm OFFcE, TE CHmIL, TE FAmLY, AND THE
YOUNG OFFENDER, id. at 440.
124 For a proposal to reduce the workload of juvenile court by the creation
of local councils in the United States, see Elson & Rosenheim, Justice for the Child
at the Grass Roots, 51 A.B.A.J. 341 (1965).
125 Williams & MacFaden, Why A Famihj Court?, 20 Juv. CT. JUDGES J.
96 (1969).
12 6 See Dyson & Dyson, Family Courts in the United States, 8 J. FAmmx L.
507, 519 (1968). The Pennsylvania legislation is recent. It is possible that only
the Pittsburgh Family Court is in operation. See note 122 supra. It is also possible
that North Carolina has an equivalent system. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-244,
7A-277 (Supp. 1967).
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court level might well improve the quality of trials, since it is suggested
less serious cases never reach court.1 27 But even a juvenile court
dealing with only serious cases must barely skim the surface of wide-
spread family disorder. Once a child has been adjudicated delinquent,
the disposition of all illegal family conduct should be unified. The
General Assembly in considering revision of Chapter 208 should give
serious thought to the development of a statewide family court system.
A serious effort at reform of the juvenile justice system is absolutely
necessary to stem the rising tide of juvenile delinquency.
Jack M. Smitk Jr.
127 1969 Ky. CRnm Colv.m, supra note 38, at A-10.
